Volume 3
Issue 2 Summer
Summer 1973

The Law of Medical Malpractice in New Mexico
Jerrald J. Roehl

Recommended Citation
Jerrald J. Roehl, The Law of Medical Malpractice in New Mexico, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 294 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol3/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
IN NEW MEXICO
JERRALD J. ROEHLI
If the surgeon has made a deep incision in [the body of] a [free]
man with a lancet of bronze and causes the man's death or has
opened the caruncle in [the eye of] a man and so destroys the
man's eye, they shall cut off his forehand.
The Code of Hammurabii

Although the law's attitude toward the medical profession has2
mellowed considerably since that enactment of 4,000 years ago,
medicine and law still have difficulty in attaining mutual understanding and trust. 3 One major obstacle is medical malpractice, 4 or the law
of medical professional responsibility.5 Very few medical malpractice
cases are reported for New Mexico courts prior to the 1960's,6 but in
t Member,

State Bar of New Mexico.
1. 2 Driver & Miles, The Babylonian Laws §218, at 81 (1955).
2. The first medical malpractice case was reported in England in 1374. The first reported
American case was Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794). See Stetler, History of Reported
Medical Professional Liability Cases. 30 Temp. L.Q. 366 (1957); Sandor, The History of
ProfessionalLiability Suits in the United Statei, 163 J.A.M.A. 459 (1957).
3. See 1 D. Louisell & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice 11.03 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Louisell & Williams].
4. The term "medical malpractice" has caused some difficulty. It has been defined as "[any
protessional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties,
evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct." Black, Law Dictionary 1111 (4th ed. 1951). The
term as used herein means nothing more than professional negligence by physicians.
5. The barrier to a better relationship between the medical and legal professions due to
medical malpractice cases has been summarized in a comprehensive book on medical
malpractice as follows:
It is natural and perhaps inevitable, although unfortunate, that the physician
sued for malpractice will see his true adversary not as the plaintiff but as the
plaintiff's attorney. An attitude of antipathy between any physician witness and a
cross examining lawyer is also understandable. . . . It is true that for a superficial
explanation [of the antagonism between the legal and medical professions) one
perhaps need look no further than to the increasing frequency of malpractice suits
and the fact that almost inevitably they are prosecuted by lawyers. From this
many physicians seem to conclude that lawyers are the cause of the malpractice
predicament.
1 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, 11.03 at 5.
6. Only one case reported for New Mexico courts during the first sixty years of this century
directly concerns medical malpractice. Los Alamos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coe, 58 N.M. 686,
275 P.2d 175 (1954). Three other opinions during this time period only remotely concern
medical malpractice. Munroe v. Wall, 66 N.M. 15, 340 P.2d 1069 (1959) (osteopaths cannot be
placed on equal footing with physicians who are graduates of approved medical schools);
Johnson v. Armstrong & Armstrong, 41 N.M. 206, 66 P.2d 992 (1937) (third person not obligated
to pay physician for patient's treatment where third person requested physician to treat
patient); Territory v. Lotspeich, 14 N.M. 412, 94 P. 1025 (1908) (unlawful practice of medicine).
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the last decade the number of published malpractice cases has
increased dramatically. 7 As a result, the law of medical malpractice
in New Mexico has virtually developed in the last few years. 8 The
more recent cases demonstrate that this development must still
continue; further exposition is needed, particularly in the areas of
standards of care, expert testimony, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
informed consent and the statute of limitations.
STANDARDS OF CARE

Unlike the Code of Hammurabi which imposed the strict liability
of an insurer on the physicians of that day, the modem law of medical
malpractice does not require that the physician be an insurer "of a
cure, or even of beneficial results, unless he has bound himself by
special contract to effect a cure. ' 9 Moreover, a bad result, no matter
how bad, is insufficient to establish the unskillfulness or negligence of
a physician. 10 The New Mexico Supreme Court has stated:
The fact that a poor result is achieved or that an unintended
incident transpired, unless exceptional circumstances are present,
does not establish liability without a showing that the result or
incident occurred because of the physician's failure to meet the
standard of care either by his acts, neglect, or inattention. 1

The standard of care which is required of a physician in a medical
malpractice case is based on his specialized knowledge or skill.' 2 This
standard has been generally defined as follows:
A physician is not required to exercise the highest degree of skill
and diligence possible, in the treatment of an injury, unless he has
See also Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944) (New Mexico
statute not allowing naturopathic healer the benefit of "Grandfather Clause" available to other
branches of healing art upheld).
7. Ten medical malpractice cases have been reported by the New Mexico Supreme Court in.
the last ten years. Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Jewell v.
Seidenberg, 82 N.M. 120, 477 P.2d 296 (1970); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250
(1967); Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M.
445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Stake v. Woman's Div. of Christian Serv., 73 N.M. 303, 387 P.2d 871
(1963); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963); Burks v. Baumgartner, 72 N.M. 123,
381 P.2d 57 (1963); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,377 P.2d 520 (1962); Kilkenny v. Kenny, 68
N.M. 266,361 P.2d 149 (1961).
8. See Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M.
423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Roybal v.
White, 72 N.M. 285,383 P.2d 250 (1963); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221,377 P.2d 520 (1962).
9. Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 383, 153 S.E. 653 (1930). See also Cervantes v. Forbis, 73
N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964).
10. Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 426, 394 P.2d 269, 272 (1964); Cervantes v. Forbis,
73 N.M. 445, 448, 389 P.2d 210, 213(1964).
11. Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 448, 389 P.2d 210, 213(1964).
12. Prosser, Law of Torts 124-35 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement of Torts §290, comment e at 779
(1934); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1959).
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agreed by special contract to do so. In the absence of such special
contract, he is only required to exercise such reasonable and
ordinary skill and diligence as are ordinarily exercised by the
average of the members of the profession in good standing, in
similar localities and in the same general line of practice .... 13

Thus, a physician's standard of care has been summarized traditionally as the diligence ordinarily exercised by other physicians of the
same skill in the same general community. 14 This will be referred to
as the community standard of care. The reasoning behind the
limitation to the same general community is that courts have believed
that significant differences exist between the facilities, opportunities
for research and the extent of medical knowledge of those physicians
practicing in large metropolitan areas and those practicing in rural
areas.' 5 The current uniformity in standards of medical schools and
licensing boards has diminished the significance of the community
limitation. 16 Yet there is still a need for courts to recognize that "due
7
care in a lumber camp might be gross negligence at Johns Hopkins."'
Although most jurisdictions in the country have followed the
community standard of care, 18 recent cases indicate that the community standard is being abandoned in some states and is being replaced
with a measure requiring the physician to meet a national standard of
care. 19 That standard would allow for a determination based on
recognized medical practices outside of the community. In addition
to other advantages, 20 this approach might enable the courts to judge
physicians accused of malpractice on the basis of published guidelines
approved by a board of prominent doctors practicing the same
13. United Dentists, Inc. v. Bryan, 158 Va. 880, 884-85, 164 S.E. 554, 555 (1932). See
Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 353, 482 P.2d 55, 56 (1971) (approving N.M. Uniform
Jury Instruction 8.1).
14. Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964); Cervantes v.
Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964).
15. Shepherd, The Law of Medical Malpracticein Virginia, 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 212, 221
(1964).
16. id.
17. Fox v. Mason, 139 Va. 667, 671, 124 S.E. 405, 406 (1924).
18. Shartel & Plant, The Law of Medical Practice 116-17 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Shartel
& Plant].
19. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich.
248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Douglas v. Bussaberger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968);
Stone v. Sisters of Charity of House of Province, 2 Wash. App. 607, 469 P.2d 229 (1970). See also
Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va.
977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
20. Adoption of a national standard of care would abrogate the locale rule, allowing doctors
to testify who are not from the same community. Notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra. A
national standard would also perhaps enable medical treatises to be substituted for expert
testimony. Text accompanying notes 58-59 infra.
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specialty. 21 The application of these guidelines in medical malpractice cases has been advocated by a number of respected physicians. 22
A prominent physician and medico-legal expert 23 has suggested that
the national standard of care would permit a court to decide
physicians' negligence by accepted medical procedures as set forth in
recognized medical school textbooks and medical treatises.2 4
Although New Mexico has consistently adhered to the community
standard 2 5 one case suggests this allegiance may not be exclusive. In
Los Alamos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coe, 26 the New Mexico Supreme
Court upheld a verdict for plaintiff although the trial court had
admitted testimony by an expert witness who practiced more than
800 miles from the community. The case arose when the Los Alamos
Medical Center filed suit against a patient's husband for judgment on
an account. The patient and her husband filed a counterclaim against
the medical center and her physician for malpractice, claiming that
the physician was negligent in prescribing morphine to the patient
and allowing her to take the drug at home over a long period of time.
The patient alleged that because the physician failed to supervise the
administration of the drug which she took frequently and in large
doses, she became addicted to morphine. The physician alleged
contributory negligence, contending that he had warned the patient
and her husband of the dangers associated with morphine, and that if
they allowed the drug to be administered frequently knowing of these
dangers, they were contributorily negligent. The physician also
contended through the testimony of specialists in drug addiction that
the quantity of drugs administered to the patient could not result in
addiction, and that the withdrawal of a true addict could not be
21. Address by Dr. Charles Frankel, M.D., Medico-Legal Seminar Course, Washington and
Lee University School of Law, Lexington, Va., March 17, 1971 (hereinafter cited as Address).
For Dr. Frankel's qualifications, see infra note 23.
22. The American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons is currently writing a set of guidelines for
orthopedic surgeons which will purportedly set forth a national standard of care for this surgical
group. There has been no indication by the courts or legislatures as to its adoption as a national
standard of care for legal purposes. Address, supra note 21.
23. Dr. Charles Frankel, LL.B., University of Virginia, M.D., Rush Medical School,
University of Chicago; staff physician, University of Virginia Hospital; professor of orthopedic
surgery, University of Virginia Medical School; certified by the American Board of Orthopedic
Surgery. Dr. Frankel was instrumental in the abrogation of the expert testimony "locale rule" in
Georgia. See Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965).
24. Address, supra note 21.
25. Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964); Cervantes v.
Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Burks v. Baumgartner, 72 N.M. 123, 381 P.2d 57
(1963); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Binns v. Schoenbrum, 81 N.M.
489, 468 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1970). But see Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 58 N.M. 686, 275
P.2d 175 (1954).
26. 58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175(1954).
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accomplished in the short time taken by the patient. In rebuttal, the
patient offered testimony of an Albuquerque physician and a Los
Angeles surgeon that the patient was addicted. The accused physician
objected that the two doctors testifying against him were not experts
in drug addiction, and had admitted to their lack of expertise during
their testimony. However, the court held their testimony admissible,
even though the two doctors were not from the same general
community as the accused physician and were totally unfamiliar with
that community's standards of care. The court stated:
The mere fact that [the Los Angeles surgeon] may have had no
particular experience in the immediate vicinity of Los Alamos in
the use of morphine, does not render his testimony inadmissible.
The standard of care and skill required of physicians in administering morphine is unquestionably the same. . . . [WJhile not
claiming to be an expert on the subject of narcotics, [he] has
observed many addicts and actually treated several cases ...
We think they were competent to testify, though they may not be
highly qualified to testify on the subject.2 7 [Emphasis added.]
It has been suggested that the standard of care and skill required of
physicians is unquestionably the same in many operating procedures,
diagnoses and various other medical treatments. 2 8 Thus, it might be
successfully argued from Coe that, in New Mexico, the question of a
physician's negligence in common medical matters may be determined by testimony of doctors from throughout the country who are
knowledgeable in the particular field. If the supreme court accepted
this argument, the standard of care in medical malpractice cases in
New Mexico would be judged in the light of evidence presented by
29
physicians from outside the defendant physician's community.30
However, subsequent cases demonstrate a reluctance to extend Coe.
This reluctance may exist only because the courts have not confronted
3 1 similar to that in Coe, which would
a common medical matter,
32
extension.
an
such
enable
27. 58 N.M. at 692, 275 P.2d at 179.
28. Address, supra note 21.
29. The rule against expert testimony by physician outside of the general community,
referred to as the locale rule, has a definite interrelationship with the community standard of
care. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
30. Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
31. The Coe opinion emphasized the testimony by the Albuquerque physician and Los
Angeles surgeon to the effect that "it was a simple matter to detect whether a patient is
addicted to the use of narcotics." The fact that detection of narcotic addiction was a common
medical matter undoubtedly influenced the court in allowing the testimony. 58 N.M. at 692, 275
P.2d at 179.
32. See cases cited note 31 supra.
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EXPERT TESTIMONY

A basic requirement in any medical malpractice case is that expert
testimony be given by physicians. 33 New Mexico has consistently
followed this rule.3 4 It is often difficult to comply with this requirement since most doctors are reluctant to expound on the inadequacy
of a colleague's method of treatment or practice.3 5 The necessity for
the testimony of other physicians has created grave frustrations for
plaintiff's attorneys, and has been the greatest source of criticism of
malpractice law.3 6
The need for expert testimony is complicated by the community
standard of care. 37 Physicans are even more reluctant to testify
against a doctor of the same community, especially where that
community has a small population.3 8 The requirement of doctors
testifying from 39the same community or locale has been referred to as
the locale rule.
The difficulty inherent in obtaining expert testimony in accordance
with the locale rule and the community standard of care would be
lessened by adopting a national standard of care. 40 Under a national
41
standard of care, doctors from throughout the country could testify.
Attorneys would not have to confront a doctor's aversion to testifying
against a fellow physician from the same community.
There is evidence that the locale rule has already deteriorated to
42
some extent in New Mexico. Los Alarnos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coe
shows that compliance with the locale rule is not always required. In
33. Shartel & Plant, supra note 18 at 130.
34. Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964).
35. Address, supra note 21. See e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118
(1959); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 283 P.2d 862
(1956); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956); Johnston v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 94 N.W.
607 (1903); Steiginga v. Thron, 30 N.J. Super. Ct. 423, 105 A.2d 10 (1954). The reluctance or
refusal of physicians to testify against each other has been characterized as the conspiracy of
silence. See e.g., Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common Law
Innovations, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1019 (1961).
36. See e.g., Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, I Vill. L.
Rev.*250 (1956); contra, Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations-The Brighter Side, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 497
(1957); Comment, 17 U. Miami L. Rev. 182 (1962).
37. See cases cited notes 39-40 supra.
38. Address, note 21 supra.
39. See e.g., comment, Locality Doctrine and the Standard of Care of a Physician, 8
Washburn L.J. 339 (1969); Comment, Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Suits, 5 Cal. W. L.
Rev. 124 (1968).
40. See Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354
Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970);
Douglas v. Bussaberger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968); Stone v. Sisters of Charity of
House of Province, 2 Wash. App. 607, 469 P.2d 229 (1970); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va.
977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
41. Id.
42. 58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954).
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Coe the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the expert testimony
over objection that the
of a Los Angeles surgeon was admissible
43
testimony violated the locale rule.
Although Coe is noteworthy as an exception to the locale rule, it
has lost some of its significance because of the refusal of the courts to
44
In Cervantes v. Forbis,45 the New Mexico Supreme Court
apply it.
emphasized the necessity of expert testimony showing failure to meet
a community standard of care. The patient, suing two physicians for
negligent treatment of a broken right femur, could not obtain expert
testimony by any doctor in the community. The court held that the
lack of expert testimony on negligence and proximate cause entitled
the physicians to summary judgment. 46 It is notable, however, that
the court also observed:
While we are not called upon to determine if in a proper case a
prima facie case might not be made without the necessity 47of
producing an expert, we are satisfied that this is not such a case.
It is therefore conceivable that a partial abrogation of the expert
testimony rule could be established where special circumstances not
requiring an expert were present. 4 8 Such circumstances have apparently not yet been presented to a New Mexico court, 49but an
otherwise frustrated plaintiff should not ignore this possibility.
Should a national standard of care be adopted in New Mexico or
the locale rule be abandoned, a step further would allow use of
50
medical treatises and pamphlets as substitutes for expert testimony.
43. Text accompanying note 27 supra.
44. See Williams v. Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55 (1971); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M.
406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964).
45. 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210(1964).
46. 389 P.2d at 213.
47. Id.
48. The special circumstances not requiring expert testimony to which the court referred
would normally involve circumstantial evidence so that the doctrine of res ipso loquitur could
be successfully utilized.
49. Plaintiffs have unsuccessfully contended through unique arguments that the circumstances present in their cases were such as to not require expert testimony. See e.g., Crouch v.
Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964).
50. A few states have enacted statutes which enable courts to use medical treatises or other
medical literature as a substitute for expert testimony. Nevada has adopted such a statute, and
the pertinent section reads as follows:
A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained in a
published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion of the
court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the writer of such
statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject, be
admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against
physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, osteopathic physicians or surgeons,
chiropractors, chiropodists, naturopathic physicians, hospitals and sanitaria, as
evidence tending to prove the fact or as opinion evidence.
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Medical treatises, pamphlets or drug manufacturers' instructions
cannot now be used to substitute for expert testimony.5 1 In Crouch v.
MIost 5 2 an action was brought against a physician for negligent
treatment of a snake bite. The plaintiff attempted to introduce an
instruction sheet prepared by the manufacturer of the snake bite kit
which the defendant physician used in treating the plaintiff. The
plaintiff intended to show that the doctor had been negligent in not
complying with the directions in the instruction sheet. The trial court
ruled that the instruction sheet was inadmissible and the New Mexico
Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted, however, that the information contained in the instruction sheet had nevertheless been placed
in the record through the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness,
ruling was therefore immaterial because any
and that the trial court's
53
error was harmless.
In addition to the invalidation of the locale rule through adoption
of a national standard and the use of medical treatises, two other
suggestions for solving the problem of expert testimony have been
made. These involve plans for obtaining impartial medical testimony
and for insuring the availability of an expert when the plaintiff has a
meritorious case. The impartial medical testimony plan has received
substantial support as a result of its application in other types of
personal injury cases, especially in New York. 54 It has been considered in New Mexico. 55 This plan is based on the appointment of a
doctor who becomes the court's witness. The parties, however, are
not bound by the doctor's findings. The proposal has not yet been
applied in malpractice litigation. It may be difficult to do so because
necessary medical cooperation may be lacking.
The second suggestion foresees the establishment of a Medical
Malpractice Screening Panel which would provide experts for
56
meritorious cases. This proposal has been adopted in a few states,
Nev. Rev. Stat. §51.040 (1967). See also Mass Rev. Stat. Ann. §79C (1969); R.I. Acts & Resolves
ch. 230 at 1108 (1969).
51. See Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250(1967).
52. Id.
53. 78 N.M. at 408,432 P.2d at 251-52.
54. See Peck, A Successful New Plan: Impartial Medical Testimony, 42 A.B.A.J. 31 (1959);
Impartial Medical Testimony, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 184 (1960); Comment, Impartial Medical
Testimony Plans, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1019 (1961).
55. Interview with Joseph E. Roehl, senior partner, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk,
Albuquerque, N.M., former member of Medico-Legal Screening Panel for State Bar of New
Mexico. May, 1971.
56. This proposal has been adopted in Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico and Virginia.
Letter from Mr. Howard Hassard, senior partner, Hassard, Bonnington, Rogers & Huber, San
Francisco, Cal., Apr. 24, 1971. Mr. Hassard is urging the State of California to adopt such a
plan. See also Virginia Bar News 12-13, May 1961.
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including New Mexico. The New Mexico panel is the subject of a
student note following in this issue. 57
Logic would dictate that the locale rule could also be waived by a
defendant physician who wanted the expert testimony of a doctor
from outside of the community in his own behalf. Since the locale rule
protects the physician from testimony by other doctors unfamiliar
with the practice and procedures in his community, the defendant
physician should have the power to waive it. The waiver has been
considered by the Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions of the
New Mexico Supreme Court and there is some probability that it will
be incorporated in the Uniform Jury Instructions. 58
A fourth solution to the expert testimony problem advocates the
submission of medical malpractice claims to an arbitration panel. 59
Under such a plan the board of arbitrators, composed of lawyers and
doctors, would determine the merit of the claim and encourage the
parties to settle without filing suit.60 The determination of the
arbitration panel would not be binding but could be utilized to keep
unnecessary cases out of crowded court dockets. 6 1
As these plans are better understood and receive more publicity, 6 2
it is likely that more states will want to put them into use. 63
RES IPSA LOQUITUR

The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the law of
medical malpractice has been controversial. 64 Despite this, courts in
many jurisdictions have been requested to apply the doctrine to
57. Note, 3 N.M.L. Rev. 311 (1973).
58. Interview with Joseph E. Roehl, supra note 55, Chairman of the New Mexico Supreme
Court Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions and author of New Mexico Uniform Jury
Instructions.
59. J..F. Lillard, III, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 Arb. J. 193 (1971).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The State Bar of New Mexico received the American Bar Association's 1971 Award of
Merit in the state and local bar association competition for the establishment and success of the
Medico-Legal Screening Panel. 10 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 165 (August 5, 1971).
63. Many states have shown a substantial interest in promulgating a plan for screening
medical malpractice cases similar to the New Mexico Plan, particularly since the Award of
Merit was received. Interview with Irwin S. Moise, Chairman, Medico-Legal Screening Panel
for State Bar of New Mexico, former Chief Justice of New Mexico Supreme Court and presently
senior partner of the Albuquerque firm of Sutin, Thayer & Browne, May, 1972.
64. See generally Bulman, Res lpsa Loquitur-Where Does it Apply?, 1961 Ins. L.J. 20; D.
Louisell & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice 11406-1408 (1970). Application of the doctrine in
medical malpractice cases has been met with extensive criticism. See Adamson, Medical
Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1962); Morris, "'Res Ipsa
Loquitur -- Liability Without Fault, 163 J.A.M.A. 1055 (1957); Rossen, Defense Against Res Ipsa
in Medical Malpractice, 13 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 128 (1968); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1950); Comment, RIL v. The Expert Witness in Medical
Malpractice, 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 292 (1964).
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medical malpractice for some time. 65 The New Mexico Supreme
66
Court confronted the issue only recently in Buchanan v. Downing.
In Buchanan the plaintiff, after suffering from diarrhea and nausea
for three days, received an injection of sparine from the defendant
physician. The plaintiff immediately reacted, his skin reddening at
the place of the injection. The reddening turned into an open,
festering sore which subsequently required a skin graft. The plaintiff,
in suing the physician and the manufacturer of the drug, relied on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of both defendants. The decision was affirmed on
appeal, the supreme court holding that the doctrine did not apply
because plaintiff has not established its minimum prerequisites. The
court enumerated them as follows:
It is generally said that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply
these elements must exist: (1) That the accident be of the kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) that it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within exclusive control and management of the defendant.67

Although the plaintiff satisfied the second prerequisite by showing
that the instrument was in the exclusive control of the defendant, his
failure to satisfy the first prerequisite caused the court to rule:
It is the absence of any showing that, without the defendant's
negligence, the unnatural reaction by the plaintiff would not have
68
occurred, which takes the case outside the res ipsa loquitur rule.
Although the plaintiff failed, it is interesting to note how he
attempted to show that the accident would not have occurred unless
someone was negligent. The plaintiff contended that the statement by
the defendant's expert witness that the plaintiff's injury was "not a
natural reaction to such an injection 69 amounted to a sufficient
showing that the accident would not have happened but for
someone's negligence and that, therefore, the defendant was required
by the doctrine to meet the burden of proof.70 The court, however,
65. See e.g., Hunter v. Borroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
66. 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2 269 (1964), commented on in 6 Natural Resources J. 334 (1966).
67. 394 P.2d at 271.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The plaintiff's contention that he had met the requirements of res ipsa loquitur, causing
the burden of proof to shift to the defendant, and the court's restatement of this without
correction is misleading. In the view of eminent legal scholars, the burden of proof never shifts,
even in a valid res ipsa case only the production burden shifts. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§§2486-89 (3d ed. 1940); Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 355--85 (1898); Laughlin,
The location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 3, 4-5, 12, 24-26 (1956). See also
Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 946-47 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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pointed out that the defendant's expert also testified that the reaction
could have been due to many factors, including the nature of the
medicine, the allergies of the patient, or the manner in which the
injection was given. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had thus
failed to prove the accident would not have occurred but for
someone's negligence and ruled that the doctrine was inapplicable.
Plaintiff's attorneys rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because, if the plaintiff can satisfy both prerequisites, the burden of
producing evidence 71 shifts to the defendant.7 2 It may also permit the
73
plaintiff to establish his cause of action without expert witnesses.
Finally, application of the doctrine virtually assures the plaintiff of
74
reaching the jury.
Because of these advantages, plaintiff's attorneys have urged courts
to apply the doctrine to malpractice litigation. Their efforts have
been quite successful in some jurisdictions. For instance, in California
the doctrine was held applicable in two cases 75 with facts similar to
Buchanan. The California courts in both cases said that it was a
matter of common knowledge that injections do not cause injury
unless unskillfully given or unless the serum is defective. The
Buchanan decision expressly considered and rejected the California
approach. The court felt that it would place too great a burden on
76
doctors in New Mexico.
The Buchanan decision accords with the majority rule.7 7 Other
courts have avoided the application of res ipsa loquitur to medical
malpractice cases because it would impose strict liability on doctors,
making them liable for not effecting a cure in some instances.7 8 This
view was summarized by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, then a Circuit Judge,
in a leading case as follows:
If the maxim "res ipsa loquitur" were applicable to a case like
this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however
71. The burden of producing evidence along with the burden of persuasion have traditionally been characterized as elements of the burden of proof. Like the general burden of proof, the
burden of persuasion never shifts but the burden of producing evidence may shift. Laughlin, The
Location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 3, 4-5, 24-26 (1956).
72. See Hamilton v. Southern Ry. Co., 162 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1947); Dietze v. King, 184 F.
Supp. 944, 946-47 (E.D. Va. 1960). But see Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269
(1964).

73. Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653 (1930). See also Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M.
445, 448-49, 389 P.2d 210, 213.
74. See Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 947 (E.D. Va. 1960).
75. Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d (1959); Bauer v. Otis, 33 Cal. App. 2d 439,
284 P.2d 113 (1955).
76.

394 P.2d at 272.

77. Id. at 272-73.
78. Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (6th Cir. 1897); Henley v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653
(1930).
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slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon
causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to
practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial
liability for nearly "all the ills that flesh is heir to."7 9
In view of such consequences, it is very probable that the New
Mexico courts will adhere to Buchanan in holding the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable in most medical malpractice cases. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Cervantes v. Forbis,8 0 the supreme
court left the question unsettled:
While we are not called upon to determine if in a proper case a
prima facie case might not be made without the necessity of
producing an expert, we are satisfied that this is not such a case.8 1
INFORMED CONSENT
Like questions involving the application of res ipsa loquitur to
medical malpractice law, the development of the rule of informed
consent is of recent origin in New Mexico.8 2 This rule requires the
physician to disclose all risks inherent in a contemplated treatment.
Unless such disclosure is made to the patient, the doctor may be liable
for any resulting injury.8 3 Liability may exist even though the patient
has expressly consented to the treatment because a patient must be
informed of the dangers of the treatment before he can effectively
consent to it.84 A physician may not treat a patient without consent
unless special circumstances, such as an emergency, are present. 85
The physician must disclose all reasonable risks involved in the
treatment or chance liability for assault and battery 86 or negligence. 87
In the past decade, over twenty jurisdictions, including New Mexico,
have evolved standards for cases concerning informed consent.88
In Woods v. Brumlop 89 the New Mexico Supreme Court directly
confronted the issue of informed consent. In that case the plaintiff was
referred by her physician to Dr. Brumlop for psychiatric treatment.
79. 78 F. 442, at 443.
80. 73 N.M. 445,389 P.2d 210(1964).
81. 73 N.M. at 449, 389 P.2d at 213.
82. The New Mexico Supreme Court directly confronted the rule of informed consent for the
first time in 1962. See Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
83. 1 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, at 22.01.
84. Natanson v. Klein, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
85. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 228, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (1962); 1 Louisell & Williams,
supra note 3, at 122.01.
86. See e.g., Scott v. Wilson, 296 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), aff'd, 412 S.W.2d
299 (Tex. 1967).
87. See e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
88. See discussion and cases gathered in 2 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, at
1i22.01-2209.
89. 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
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Dr. Brumlop subsequently advised the plaintiff to undergo electroshock but refused to give the treatments herself, suggesting that the
plaintiff enter the New Mexico Mental Hospital. The electroshock
treatments were thus administered to the plaintiff in the State
Hospital. The plaintiff claimed tht she received a compression
fracture of her spine and a loss of hearing as a result.
The plaintiff alleged that although Dr. Brumlop did not administer
the treatments, she was liable because she did not inform the plaintiff
of the risks inherent in electroshock, and because she told the plaintiff
that no harmful results could occur, knowing that this was untrue.
The plaintiff also contended that the doctor's failure to inform her
deprived her of any basis upon which to predicate her consent.
A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and defendant appealed. The
supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that
the plaintiff's testimony that the electroshock treatments destroyed
most of her hearing was inadmissible because she was a lay witness.
The testimony raised a fact question whether the physician falsely
advised the patient that no danger could result from the treatment.
On the issue of informed consent, the court said:
The physician has the duty to make a full and frank disclosure to
the patient of all pertinent facts relative to his illness and the
treatment prescribed or recommended therefor.
. .. The real basis for the rule requiring disclosure is to give the
patient a basis upon which to exercise judgment as to whether he
will consent to the treatment. Without the disclosure by the
doctor it is said that the patient is not 90informed and that,
therefore, any consent obtained is ineffectual.
With the rule of informed consent thus established in New Mexico,
attorneys would be well-advised to consider its application in pending
medical malpractice cases.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
malpractice
The application of the statute of limitations to medical
91
actions has received extensive treatment in the courts and in legal
publications. 92 The problem normally arises when a foreign object has
been left in the body of a patient and is not discovered until after the
90. 71 N.M. at 227, 377 P.2d at 524.
91. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
92. Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York's New Civil PracticeLaw and
Rules, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 42 (1962); Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and
Surgeons, 1953 Wash. U.L.Q. 413; Note, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 412 (1961); Note, 27 Albany L. Rev.
312 (1963); Note, 37 St. John's L. Rev. 385 (1963); Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 540 (1964).
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statute of limitations has run. According to many courts, 9 3 the
patient's claim against the surgeon is barred.
Statutes of limitations are intended to prevent fraudulent and stale
claims with their attending difficulty of securing witnesses
and
evidence. 94 However, most of these considerations are not present
in a
typical foreign objects case. These cases do not involve a plaintiff
delaying pursuit of his rights. On the contrary, the facts of a typical
case establish that the cause of action was unknown and unknowable
to the plaintiff until after the statute had run. 93 Moreover, the lapse
of
time does not entail the danger of a false or frivolous claim, nor
the
danger of a speculative or uncertain claim since fraud is negated
by
the existence of the object itself.96
Because of the hardships which a statute of limitations can work
on
a plaintiff in such a case, 97 many states have adopted the discovery
rule, which 98 tolls the statute until the patient discovers, or should
have discovered by reasonable diligence, the cause of action. 9 9
Thus,
under this rule the statute begins to run when the patient finds
the
object in his body rather than when it was left there by the physician.
In Roybal v. White'0 0 the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled
that
the discovery rule was not applicable to a foreign objects case because
of the state legislature's failure to indicate otherwise. The plaintiff
filed suit in February 1962 for injuries sustained in an operation
performed in January 1952 when the physician allegedly left a sponge
in the plaintiff's abdominal cavity. The sponge was removed in
July
1961.
The suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it
was
barred by the statute of limitations.101 On appeal the ruling
was
affirmed by the supreme court, which held that the legislature's
failure to include the discovery exception in the tort action limitation
was binding on the court. The court reasoned that the legislature
could have provided otherwise, as it had done with other excep02
tions.1
A plaintiff can attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations
by
93. 1 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, 13.06, at 370.
94. See 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §1 (1948).
95. See Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
96. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d
(1964).
97. See e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 224
277 (1961); Roybal v. White, 72 N.M.
285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963).
98. 1 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, 13.06, at 372.
99. See e.g., Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954);
Costa v. Regents of Univ. of
Calif., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1952).
100. 72 N.M. 285,383 P.2d 250(1963).
101. 72 N.M. at 226, 383 P.2d at 251.
102. 72 N.M. at 227, 383, P.2d at 252.
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alleging and proving fraudulent concealment as provided in N.M.
Stat. Ann. §23-1-7 (1953). Fraudulent concealment will toll the
in his
statute.' 0 3 The plaintiff, however, must allege concealment
10 4 To effectively
later.
so
complaint or he may be barred from doing
demonstrate fraudulent concealment in a foreign objects case, the
plaintiff must show that the physician committed some overt act
to fraud which concealed the problem from the plaintantamount
1 05
Although the doctrine has never been raised in a reported
tiff.
1°
foreign objects case in New Mexico, 6 0 it7 has been successfully
asserted in such cases in other jurisdictions.
Even though the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may be
invoked in some foreign objects cases to mitigate the hardships of
Roybal' 0 8 and the statute of limitations, it 0is9 extremely doubtful that
the doctrine would apply in all such cases.' To fully ameliorate the
hardships arising from cases such as Roybal, a longer statute of
0
should
limitations should be enacted" or the principle of discovery
112 A longer
decision.
judicial
or
statute"'
by
be made applicable
statute of limitations would not make claims more speculative or
uncertain, for leavinga foreign object in the patient's body is clearly
negligent. 113 Perhaps the greater lapse of time would make it harder
for the patient to link the negligence to the defendant physician.
From the physician's point of view, a longer statute of limitation
would make him more susceptible to the difficulties of lost evidence
103. 72 N.M. at 287,383 P.2d at 252.
fradulent concealment
104. In Roybal the court emphasized the rule to the effect that since
was not alleged in the complaint, it could not be urged on appeal. Id.
105. Shartell & Plant, supra note 18, at 173.
brought to the supreme
106. The applicability of fraudulent concealment in such cases was
concealment on
fraudulent
raise
to
sought
plaintiff
the
court's attention in Roybal, where
him from raising it
appeal but the court held that his failure to allege it in the complaint barred
concealment was
on appeal. 72 N.M. at 287, 383, P.2d at 252. The doctrine of fraudulent
in Mantz v.
County
Bernalillo
for
Court
District
State
in
level
court
trial
recently raised at the
Albuquerque
with
partner
Taichert,
D.
Robert
with
Follingstad, Cause No. A-42908. Interview
defense verdict was upheld on
firm of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, May, 1972. The
1972).
App.
(Ct.
68
P.2d
505
473,
N.M.
84
Follingstad,
v.
Mantz
appeal.
107. 1 Louisell & Williams, supra note 3, 13.11 at 379-82.
114 infr.
108. 72 N.M. at 287, 383 P.2d at 252. See text accompanying note
Gray v. Wright, 142 W.
109. See e.g., Draws v. Levin, 332 Mich. 447, 52 N.W.2d 180 (1952);
Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671 (1957).
for foreign objects cases.
110. No state legislature has enacted a longer period of limitations
But see note 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1577 (1964).
statute of limitations for
Missouri has incorporated the principle of discovery into their
11i.
within two years from
brought
be
must
action
of
cause
the
that
stating
by
medical malpractice
ascertainment." Mo.
of
capable
"is
therefrom
resulting
the time that the wrong and damage
351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760
Rev. Stat. §§516.100, 516.140 (1949). See also Thatcher v. De Tar,
(1943).
through adjudication,
112. For jurisdictions which have adopted the principle of discovery
see cases cited notes 105 and 107 supra.
113. See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1023, 1030(1930).
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and unavailable witnesses. Although application of the discovery rule
would also present these problems it may be the best solution because
the time lapse could be minimized by the requirement of reasonable
diligence in discovery. Balancing the equities, the injustice of denying
innocently ignorant malpractice victims judicial relief should override
the policy of repose and security from stale claims.
CONCLUSION
While the subject matter and cases discussed in this article indicate
that New Mexico is not as liberal as some jurisdictions in the law of
medical malpractice, relaxing current requirements in the areas
treated herein might saddle the profession with burdens it could not
endure. For instance, if a national standard of care were adopted in
New Mexico, it would eventually mean use of published guidelines or
medical treatises instead of expert testimony. Courts would then
determine a physician's negligence by deciding whether the physician
met requirements set forth in the treatise. This manner of determination would closely resemble the "slot machine" theory of analytical
jurisprudence. 114 This method would not allow for much flexibility
in borderline cases, 115 would undermine the importance of the
jury," 6 and would remove the human element from medical malpractice cases. 117 If the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were extended to
cover more medical malpractice cases, this also would place a heavy
burden on physicians because the doctrine shifts the burden of
114. The "slot-machine" theory, more recently referred to as the "computer" theory,
presupposes that a system of law can be so perfectly codified as to include every possible legal
situation or controversy and the appropriate solution. With such a system, the jury would not be
needed since the perfect code would theoretically handle every conceivable case. The code
would be applied once the facts were ascertained and it would automatically render a decision
just as money is inserted in a slot machine, a lever pulled and winning oranges or losing plums
are shown, or like the computer, facts are fed into the computer and an answer is flashed or
delivered to a slot.
John Austin, the founder of the analytical school of jurisprudence, has been criticized for his
theory of law which in part advocates the adoption of a "slot-machine" theory of law based on a
perfect code. 1 S. Simpson & J. Stone, Law and Society 656-57 (1948), quoting 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries 69-72 (1st ed. 1765). See also I J. Stone, Lawyers and Lawyers' Reasoning 257,
287-88, 330 (1950); J. Stone, The Province and Function of the Law 70-73, 149-206 (1946). Cf. 1
R. Pound, Jurisprudence 71-81 (1959); 2 R. Pound Jurisprudence 148-49 (1959).
115. Medical malpractice cases can involve very close questions of negligence and therefore
require a large degree of flexibility to avoid inequitable results.
116. The New Mexico Supreme Court has determined that expert testimony does not invade
the province of the jury since the jurors can accept or reject such testimony at their own
discretion after the expert has been subjected to both direct and cross examination. Williams v.
Vandenhoven, 82 N.M. 352, 482 P.2d 55, 57 (1971). However, allowing the court to determine a
doctor's negligence on the basis of a medical treatise would remove the decisional power from
the jury and there would be no opportunity of cross examination.
117. The importance of the human element through the jury system has been emphasized
extensively. See e.g., Lombard, Trial by Jury and Speedy justice, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 309,
311 (1971).
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producing evidence to the physician."18 If the requirements of
informed consent were made so stringent that the physician were to
be charged with informing a patient of every conceivable risk, no
matter how remote, patients might be dissuaded from undergoing
necessary treatments. 119 If the statute of limitations were lengthened
to cover every possible hardship resulting from a foreign objects case,
so great that most
the time lapse from the initial negligence would be
120
evidence would be lost and many witnesses dead.
There are alternatives available other than a national standard of
122 or a longer
care,12 1 stringent requirements of informed consent,
2 3 If law and medicine are to achieve an
statute of limitations.'
equitable interrelationship, some of these alternatives will have to be
adopted. However, courts should be cautious not to overreact to the
present inequities. The best current approach appears to be the
screening panel system for expert tesimony, 124 which enables the
legal and medical professions to attain necessary levels of cooperation. More solutions such as this must be devised if lawyers and
doctors are to achieve mutual understanding and trust. Both profesgoal, being mindful that the fault lies
sions should work toward that 12
5
not in the stars but in ourselves.

118. Renfro v. J. D. Coggins Co., 71 N.M. 310, 378 P.2d 130 (1963); Tafoya v. Las Cruces
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955).
119. 1 Louisell & Williams,.supra note 3, at122.02..
120. See note 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1577 (1964).
121. A regional standard of care has been suggested to allow for the differences in the
practice of medicine in certain regions yet doctors from outside the community could still
testify. See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
122. It has been suggested that a physician should be able to understate the possibilities of a
bad result where the statistical risk is low and the patient is emotionally unstable or unduly
apprehensive and still fulfill the requirements of informed consent. Louisell & Williams, supra
note 3, at q22.02. See also Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 341 (1968); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
123. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
124. See note 3 N.M.L. Rev. 311 (1973).
125. The last portion of this statement is a paraphrasal of a famous Shakespearean line: "The
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act I,
fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves .......
scene ii, line 134 (1598-1600).

